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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ronnie Peppers was sentenced in 2003 to fifteen years 
of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  
That was the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“the ACCA” or “the Act”), and the District 
Court imposed it because of Peppers’s previous convictions.  
Peppers now challenges that sentence as unconstitutional in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated a clause of 
the ACCA – the “residual clause” – as unconstitutionally 
vague.  He argued in District Court in a motion under 28 
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U.S.C. § 2255 that he was impermissibly sentenced under that 
invalid clause.  But that § 2255 motion was not his first, and 
§ 2255 itself, through subsection (h), places limits on any 
effort to file a second or successive collateral attack on a 
criminal judgment.  The District Court denied Peppers’s 
second § 2255 motion after determining that his prior 
convictions remained predicate offenses for ACCA purposes 
because they are covered by portions of the Act that survived 
Johnson.  Because we disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusions, we will vacate its decision and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
 
Five holdings lead to our remand.  First, the 
jurisdictional gatekeeping inquiry for second or successive 
§ 2255 motions based on Johnson requires only that a 
defendant prove he might have been sentenced under the 
now-unconstitutional residual clause of the ACCA, not that 
he was in fact sentenced under that clause.  Second, a guilty 
plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(c)(1)(C) does not preclude a defendant from collaterally 
attacking his sentence in a § 2255 motion, if his sentence 
would be unlawful once he proved that the ACCA no longer 
applies to him in light of Johnson.  Third, a defendant seeking 
a sentence correction in a second or successive § 2255 motion 
based on Johnson, and who has used Johnson to satisfy the 
gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h), may rely on post-
sentencing cases (i.e., the current state of the law) to support 
his Johnson claim.  Fourth, Peppers’s robbery convictions, 
both under Pennsylvania’s robbery statute, are not 
categorically violent felonies under the ACCA, and, 
consequently, it was error to treat them as such.  Fifth and 
finally, Peppers failed to meet his burden of proving his 
Johnson claim with respect to his Pennsylvania burglary 
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conviction.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s 
order and remand for an analysis of whether the error that 
affected Peppers’s sentence, i.e., the error of treating the 
robbery convictions as predicate offenses under the ACCA, 
was harmless in light of his other prior convictions. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. The Initial Trial and Subsequent Guilty Plea 
 
This case has a long history.  In 2000, Peppers was 
indicted for numerous federal firearms and drug offenses.  
Among those charges was murder with a firearm, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).  Peppers pled not guilty to all of the 
charges, but a jury saw things differently.  It convicted him on 
every count, including the murder charge.  He was sentenced 
to life imprisonment plus five years.   
 
Peppers filed a direct appeal, challenging, among other 
things, the District Court’s denial of his request to proceed 
pro se.  United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We concluded that the District Court erred in handling 
Peppers’s request to represent himself, and thus we vacated 
the judgment and commitment order and remanded the case 
for a new trial.   
 
On remand, Peppers was adamant that he did not want 
to go through another trial.  Instead, he chose to plead guilty 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (the 
“(C) plea”).  As part of his plea agreement with the 
government, he waived indictment and pled to a one-count 
information charging him as an armed career criminal in 
possession of a .22 caliber revolver, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).  The charging document stated 
that Peppers had previously been convicted of a variety of 
state and federal felonies in six separate proceedings: first, in 
1979, when he was a juvenile, for both armed robbery and 
robbery; second, in 1984 for burglary; third, in 1984 for 
possession of instruments of a crime; fourth, in 1985 for 
escape; fifth, in 1985 for armed robbery and criminal 
conspiracy; and sixth, in 1993 for criminal conspiracy to 
commit unauthorized use of an access device.  Because of his 
admitted status as an armed career criminal, the mandatory 
minimum penalty for the crime to which Peppers pled guilty 
was fifteen years’ imprisonment.  The (C) plea was 
conditioned upon the District Court sentencing him to that 
minimum penalty.   
 
The plea agreement also stated that the parties 
understood the United States Sentencing Guidelines applied 
to the offense to which Peppers was pleading guilty.  
Although the agreement made plain that Peppers was being 
convicted and sentenced as an armed career criminal under 
the ACCA, it failed to disclose which of the six convictions 
stated in the information qualified as the three predicate 
“violent felonies” that made him eligible for enhanced 
penalties under the ACCA.  That Act provides, in relevant 
part, that “a person who violates section 922(g) … and has 
three previous convictions … for a violent felony … 
committed on occasions different from one another, … shall 
be fined … and imprisoned not less than fifteen years[.]”  18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  The statute defines “violent felony” as 
“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year … that [A] has as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another; or [B] is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
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explosives, or [C] otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]”  Id. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B).  The parts labeled here as [A], [B], and [C] 
are commonly referred to, respectively, as the force or 
elements clause, the enumerated offenses clause, and the 
residual clause. 
 
At the plea colloquy, the District Court and the parties 
discussed only in broad terms whether the prior convictions 
fell within the ACCA, as the following exchange shows: 
 
 [Peppers’s Counsel]:  We also agree to 
the applicability of the sentence enhancement 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act, in that 
the government has shown the existence of 
three prior convictions which meet the 
definitions under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.  So we have agreed to that, and I have 
explained that to Mr. Peppers.  Is that correct? 
 
… [Peppers and his attorney confer off 
the record.] … 
 
 The Court:  At least, number one, the 
armed robbery and robbery and probably the 
burglary and the other armed robbery and 
criminal conspiracy would probably meet the 
Armed Career Criminal. 
 
 [Peppers’s Counsel]:  The armed robbery 
and robbery would definitely meet the 
requirements of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.  The burglary as stated at number two 
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would meet the requirements of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act.  Possession of instruments 
of a crime may or may not.  Escape may or may 
not.  But armed robbery definitely would. 
 
The Court:  We have got at least three 
there. 
 
[Peppers’s Counsel]:  Correct. 
 
(App. at 55-56.)  There was no discussion concerning which 
of the specific ACCA clauses were thought to make three of 
Peppers’s prior convictions “violent felonies.”  On August 13, 
2003, the District Court accepted the (C) plea and sentenced 
Peppers to fifteen years in prison.  
  
As allowed by his plea agreement,1 Peppers filed a 
direct appeal challenging the constitutionality of the felon-in-
possession statute he was convicted of violating, and we 
affirmed his conviction.  United States v. Peppers, 95 F. 
App’x 406 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Supreme Court later denied 
his petition for a writ of certiorari.  Peppers v. United States, 
543 U.S. 894 (2004). 
 
B. Peppers’s First § 2255 Motion 
 
On November 3, 2005, Peppers filed his first motion 
under § 2255, collaterally attacking both his conviction and 
sentence.  He advanced nine claims, all of which were 
rejected by the District Court, and Peppers appealed.  We 
                                              
1 There was no waiver of appellate or collateral attack 
rights, as is often found in plea agreements. 
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granted a certificate of appealability solely as to whether 
Peppers’s plea counsel was ineffective for allegedly 
misinforming him about the ACCA’s application and for 
failing to challenge its applicability on appeal.  We ultimately 
determined that Peppers did not receive ineffective assistance 
of counsel for either reason.  It was not ineffective to concede 
that Peppers was eligible for enhanced punishment under the 
ACCA and to negotiate for him to receive a sentence of 
fifteen years in prison, rather than having him face the 
potential of a life sentence, which he would have risked if all 
the original charges had been reinstated.  Thus, we affirmed 
the denial of Peppers’s § 2255 motion.  United States v. 
Peppers, 273 F. App’x 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
C. Peppers’s Second § 2255 Motion 
 
In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause of the 
ACCA as being unconstitutionally vague.  Then, in Welch v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), the Court made that 
ruling retroactive, so that it applies to cases on collateral 
review.  Peppers filed a timely second § 2255 motion seeking 
resentencing based on Johnson.  He also submitted the 
required application for permission to file a second such 
motion, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3).  We 
allowed him to proceed with his second § 2255 motion, 
concluding that he had satisfied the gatekeeping requirements 
of § 2255(h) – which are jurisdictional – by making “a prima 
facie showing that his proposed § 2255 motion contains a 
new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously 
unavailable.”  (App. at 136.) 
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Peppers claimed that his armed robbery convictions 
under Pennsylvania law no longer qualify as violent felonies 
after Johnson invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause.  He 
also claimed that his burglary conviction under Pennsylvania 
law no longer qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.  
Both of those claims required the District Court to resentence 
him, he said, because the fifteen-year minimum imprisonment 
sentence dictated by the ACCA no longer applied to him and 
the maximum sentence for the felon-in-possession offense he 
pled to is only ten years’ imprisonment.   
 
The government moved to dismiss the second § 2255 
motion for three reasons.  First, it argued that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider a second § 2255 motion 
from Peppers “because he has not shown that the new rule of 
constitutional law announced in Johnson applies in his case.”  
(App. at 173, 175-76.)  Essentially, the government 
contended that, because the District Court never said at 
sentencing that Peppers’s prior convictions fell under the 
ACCA’s residual clause and Peppers submitted no evidence 
showing that those convictions did not fall under another 
ACCA clause, he failed to meet the jurisdictional gatekeeping 
requirements of § 2255(h).  Second, the government 
contended that, looking to the case law that existed when 
Peppers was sentenced, Peppers’s Pennsylvania armed 
robbery convictions qualify as violent felonies under the 
ACCA’s elements clause.  Finally, the government argued 
that Peppers’s Pennsylvania burglary conviction was a violent 
felony under the ACCA’s enumerated offenses clause, 
particularly in light of “the unobjected-to-facts in the PSR[.]”  
(App. at 181.) 
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The District Court directed the government to file a 
supplemental brief addressing the impact of Peppers’s (C) 
plea on his claim for resentencing based on Johnson.  The 
government did so and argued that the plea agreement 
precluded Peppers from challenging his sentence because the 
sentence was based on the agreement and the strictures of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), not on the 
ACCA’s invalid residual clause.  Peppers countered that the 
plea agreement should not affect his ability to seek relief 
under § 2255 in light of Johnson because that agreement was 
grounded in legal error about the residual clause.   
 
The District Court ultimately denied the second § 2255 
motion on the merits because it found that Peppers’s predicate 
offenses were violent felonies under the ACCA, even in the 
absence of the residual clause.  It noted the threshold 
jurisdictional issue raised by the government but did not 
provide any independent analysis or discussion of it.  Instead, 
in a footnote, the Court adopted “the reasons set forth in 
Peppers’[s] response” to explain why he satisfied the 
jurisdictional requirements of § 2255(h).  (App. at 4 n.1.)  On 
the merits, the Court concluded that the residual clause had no 
effect on this case because Peppers had three predicate 
offenses that qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA’s 
other clauses.  Specifically, it determined that Peppers’s two 
previous armed robbery convictions in 1979 and 1985, 
respectively, qualified under the elements clause, and that 
Peppers’s burglary conviction qualified under the enumerated 
offenses clause.  The Court reached the latter conclusion 
despite recognizing that the Pennsylvania burglary statute is 
broader than generic burglary, reasoning that the evidence 
showed his conviction met the elements of the generic 
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offense.  Therefore, the District Court held that Peppers was 
ineligible for relief under § 2255.   
 
We granted Peppers a certificate of appealability on 
the question of whether he was improperly sentenced in light 
of Johnson.2  He timely appealed.   
                                              
2 Specifically, we said the following: 
 
Peppers’s application for a certification of 
appealability is granted as to his claim that, in 
light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015), he was not properly sentenced 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act because 
he does not have three or more previous 
convictions for a “violent felony.”  As to this 
claim, we are satisfied that Peppers has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.  In addition to any other 
issues that the parties wish to raise in their 
briefs, they are directed to address (a) whether 
Peppers may raise his Johnson challenge 
notwithstanding the fact that he pleaded guilty; 
(b) whether the record reveals if the District 
Court relied on the residual clause at the time of 
sentencing, and if it does not, whether this 
affects Peppers’s ability to raise a Johnson 
claim in a second or successive § 2255 motion; 
and (c) whether Peppers may rely on decisions 
that post-date his sentencing (such as Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), 
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 
(2013), and Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction 
 
This appeal raises purely legal issues, which we review 
de novo.  United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996), a defendant in federal custody may file a motion 
collaterally attacking his sentence based on certain 
specifically listed grounds, namely that the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal law, that 
the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, that 
the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or 
that the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]”  
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  And a defendant is allowed only one 
such motion as of right.  Id. § 2255(b), (h).  A second or 
successive motion must be certified by a court of appeals to 
rely upon either “newly discovered evidence” showing 
innocence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court, that was previously unavailable.”  Id. § 2255(h).  
Those are the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) that 
                                                                                                     
133 (2010)) to show that his prior convictions 
do not qualify as violent felonies or whether he 
may rely on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551 (2015), and the law as it otherwise 
existed at the time of his sentencing. 
 
(App. at 9-10 (citations omitted).) 
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limit collateral review.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 
247-48 (3d Cir. 1997) (analyzing “the two prongs of § 2255’s 
gatekeeping provision”).  The required certification is made 
pursuant to § 2244, which directs that a panel of “[t]he court 
of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive 
application only if it determines that the application … 
satisfies the [gatekeeping] requirements[.]”  Id. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(C) (made applicable by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)).  
But, even after we authorize a second or successive petition, § 
2244 still requires the district court to “dismiss any claim 
presented in a second or successive application … unless the 
applicant shows that the claim satisfies the [gatekeeping] 
requirements[.]”  Id. § 2244(b)(4).  Thus, both we and the 
district court are responsible to conduct independent analyses 
of whether the gatekeeping requirements have been satisfied 
in any particular case.  Only after a defendant’s second or 
successive motion has made it past the gatekeeping 
requirements of § 2255(h) may the district court consider the 
merits of the claims.  See In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 308 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e do not address the merits at all in our 
gatekeeping function.”). 
 
Our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s rulings 
is uncontested and is rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), which 
provides that the final order from a proceeding under § 2255 
before a district judge “shall be subject to review, on appeal, 
by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding 
[was] held.”  The District Court’s jurisdiction is contested.  
The government argued below, and argues again on appeal, 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Peppers’s 
second § 2255 motion because he did not satisfy the 
gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(4) and 
2255(h), given that no new rule of constitutional law applies 
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to him.  Even in the absence of the government’s challenge, 
we would be obligated to assess whether the District Court 
had jurisdiction to consider the motion.3  See Bruce v. 
Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (“An 
appellate federal court must satisfy itself … of [the] … 
jurisdiction … of the lower courts in a cause under review.”)). 
 
The government’s jurisdictional argument, however, 
falls short.  In our view, § 2255(h) only requires a petitioner 
to show that his sentence may be unconstitutional in light of a 
                                              
3 The gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h), which 
appear in § 2244(b)(4) and are incorporated into § 2255(h), 
are jurisdictional.  See In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 283 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he District Court must dismiss [a] habeas 
corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction if it finds that the 
requirements for filing such petition have not in fact been 
met.”); see also Hoffner, 870 F.3d at 308 (“[W]e do not 
address the merits at all in our gatekeeping function.”); 
Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 219 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“The merits of the claims in a second petition may not be 
considered by the district court until the application clears the 
‘two gates’ erected under section 2244, that of the court of 
appeals and that of the district court.”).  The Department of 
Justice has recently changed its position and no longer views 
the gatekeeping inquiry as jurisdictional, see letter of Jan. 26, 
2018, from government counsel (“Although the Government 
continues to maintain that Peppers … failed to meet the 
gatekeeping requirements and [was] properly denied relief, 
the Department of Justice no longer views the gatekeeping 
inquiry as jurisdictional.”), but that change does not comport 
with our established precedent. 
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new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the 
Supreme Court.  Peppers met that standard by demonstrating 
that he may have been sentenced under the residual clause of 
the ACCA, which was rendered unconstitutional in Johnson. 
 
Although, as already noted, both we and the District 
Court must determine whether the gatekeeping requirements 
of § 2255(h) have been met, there is a difference.  Our inquiry 
does not go as deep because we are in search of a mere 
“‘prima facie showing’ … that the petitioner has satisfied the 
pre-filing requirements ‘to warrant full exploration by the 
district court.’”  Hoffner, 870 F.3d at 308 (quoting Goldblum, 
510 F.3d at 219 & n.9).  The District Court’s analysis of the 
gatekeeping requirements, by contrast, must be “more 
extensive,” more “thorough,” and “a fuller exploration.”  
Goldblum, 510 F.3d at 220 (citation omitted).  The District 
Court is not bound by our preliminary examination of the 
gatekeeping requirements, nor should it rest on our 
determination; it must conduct an independent inquiry.  Id. at 
219-20. 
 
The specific AEDPA provision that Peppers says 
should permit consideration of his second § 2255 motion is 
the one allowing a successive collateral attack when a “claim 
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable[.]”  28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 
(b)(4).  The government contends that that provision requires 
a defendant to do more than merely invoke Johnson and 
assert that he was possibly sentenced under the residual 
clause.  Rather, the government argues, he must demonstrate 
that the sentencing court did in fact employ the residual 
clause in imposing an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.  
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That view suggests a defendant can only pass through the 
jurisdictional gate by producing evidence that his sentence 
depended “solely” upon the ACCA’s residual clause.  
(Answering Br. at 21.)  Peppers counters that AEDPA’s 
gatekeeping requirements are satisfied by showing that the 
sentencing judge may have used the residual clause.  (Reply 
Br. at 4.)  Peppers has the better position. 
 
The statutory text, case law from our sister circuits, 
and policy considerations indicate that § 2255(h) only 
requires a movant to show that his sentence may be, not that it 
must be, unconstitutional in light of a new rule of 
constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court.  It 
is true that Congress passed AEDPA with the purpose of 
restricting a defendant’s ability to collaterally attack his 
conviction or sentence, especially with a second or successive 
attack.  See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 
2004) (recognizing Congress’s goal of limiting opportunities 
for filing second or successive habeas petitions).  But, strict 
though Congress intended it to be, AEDPA surely was not 
meant to conflate jurisdictional inquiries with analyses of the 
merits of a defendant’s claims. 
 
“We begin, as usual, with the statutory text,” 
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 (2017), and 
although the text here is inconclusive, it supports adopting a 
flexible approach to satisfying the gatekeeping requirements.  
As a reminder, the burden on someone launching a second or 
successive collateral attack like Peppers’s on a conviction or 
sentence is to show that the attack “relies on a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court[.]”  Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).  In In 
re Hoffner, we recently held that “whether a claim ‘relies’ on 
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a qualifying new rule must be construed permissively and 
flexibly on a case-by-case basis.”4  870 F.3d at 308.  We 
recognized that “a motion ‘relies’ on a qualifying new rule 
where the rule ‘substantiates the movant’s claim.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  And that “is so even if the rule does not 
‘conclusively decide []’ the claim or if the petitioner needs a 
‘non-frivolous extension of a qualifying rule.’”  Id. (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted). 
 
While the statutory text arguably could support the 
government’s contention that a movant only “relies” on a new 
rule of constitutional law if he can prove his sentence in fact 
                                              
4 In Hoffner, we considered “what is required for a 
claim to ‘rel[y]’ on a qualifying new rule for the purposes of 
Section 2255(h)(2).”  870 F.3d at 308 (alteration in original).  
We made that interpretation based on what a petitioner must 
show to demonstrate a prima facie case that the prerequisites 
for a motion under § 2255(h) are met.  Id.  Section 2255(h)(2) 
does not include the word “relies” at all.  Rather, that 
language was taken from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), where the Court laid out 
the three requirements for bringing a claim based on 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A).  See Hoffner, 870 F.3d at 308 (“Even the 
Government concedes that Section 2255(h)(2) has ‘no express 
requirement that the ‘new rule’ must actually pertain to the 
petitioner’s claim.’” (citation omitted)).  But that language 
does appear in § 2244(b)(2)(A), and there is no principled 
reason for treating the term differently between the two 
provisions of AEDPA when both provisions are nearly 
identically worded and serve the same gatekeeping function, 
§ 2255(h)(2) for the court of appeals and § 2244(b)(2)(A) for 
the district court. 
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is unconstitutional under that new rule, Peppers’s 
interpretation is more consistent with Hoffner and a common 
sense analytical approach.  Because the word “relies” should 
be interpreted “flexibly” on a “case-by-case basis,” the 
implication is that a movant satisfies the gatekeeping 
requirements under § 2244(b)(2)(A) and 2255(h)(2) when he 
demonstrates that his sentence may be unconstitutional in 
light of the new rule of constitutional law.  Cf. Griffin v. 
United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 (1991) (“[W]here a provision 
of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, 
the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict 
that may have rested on that ground.”).  To interpret the 
language as the government suggests would effectively turn 
the gatekeeping analysis into a merits determination, which 
defeats the purpose of the jurisdictional review.  See Hoffner, 
870 F.3d at 308 (“[W]e do not address the merits at all in our 
gatekeeping function.”).  We thus conclude that a movant like 
Peppers satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a 
§ 2255(h)(2) motion by showing the new rule of 
constitutional law he advances may require resentencing. 
 
That conclusion finds support in decisions from other 
circuit courts.  In United States v. Winston, the Fourth Circuit 
held “that when an inmate’s sentence may have been 
predicated on application of the now-void residual clause and 
therefore, may be an unlawful sentence under the holding in 
[Johnson], the inmate has shown that he ‘relies on’ a new rule 
of constitutional law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2)(A).”  850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017).  The 
Ninth Circuit recently reached a similar conclusion in United 
States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017), in which the 
court said that, “when it is unclear whether a sentencing court 
relied on the residual clause in finding that a defendant 
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qualified as an armed career criminal, but it may have, the 
defendant’s § 2255 claim ‘relies on’ the constitutional rule 
announced in [Johnson].”  Id. at 896.5 
                                              
5 The government would have us rely on In re Moore, 
830 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016).  But that case is inapposite 
when one is considering the burden at the gatekeeping stage, 
rather than the merits stage, of the analysis.  In Moore, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit said 
in dicta that a movant cannot meet his burden in a § 2255 
proceeding “unless he proves that he was sentenced using the 
residual clause and that the use of that clause made a 
difference in the sentence.”  Id. at 1273.  So “[i]f the district 
court cannot determine whether the residual clause was used 
in sentencing and affected the final sentence—if the court 
cannot tell one way or the other—the district court must deny 
the § 2255 motion.”  Id.  But that standard describes the 
burden on the movant to show “that he is entitled to relief in a 
§ 2255 motion—not just a prima facie showing that he meets 
the requirements of § 2255(h)(2), but a showing of actual 
entitlement to relief on his Johnson claim.”  Id. at 1272.  In 
other words, the dicta referenced requirements for a merits 
ruling. 
The Eleventh Circuit applies a different standard at the 
gatekeeping stage.  It uses a “clear/unclear test” to make “a 
preliminary determination about whether a habeas petitioner 
[has] made out a prima facie showing sufficient to warrant 
leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion.”  
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.6 (11th Cir. 
2017).  That allows a movant’s § 2255 motion to be denied at 
the gatekeeping stage only if it is clear that he was sentenced 
under the elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause, 
or if it is clear that prior convictions qualifying under the 
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Policy considerations also favor the same 
interpretation.  As stated in Winston, “[n]othing in the law 
requires a [court] to specify which clause … it relied upon in 
imposing a sentence.”  850 F.3d at 682 (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted).  A defendant’s Johnson claim 
should not be unfairly tethered to the discretionary decision of 
his sentencing judge to specify the ACCA clause under which 
each prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony.  Id.  The 
government’s rule results in randomly unequal treatment of 
§ 2255 claims. 
 
Finally, contrary to the government’s characterization, 
the rule that Peppers advocates does not deprive the 
gatekeeping requirements of force.  Under the rule we 
announce today, simply mentioning Johnson in a § 2255 
motion is not enough.  The movant must still show that it is 
possible he was sentenced under the now-unconstitutional 
residual clause of the ACCA.  There are likely to be situations 
where the record is clear that a defendant was not sentenced 
under the residual clause, either because the sentencing judge 
said another clause applied or because the evidence provides 
clear proof that the residual clause was not implicated.  When 
that happens, the movant cannot establish that he may have 
been sentenced under the residual clause, and the court must 
dismiss the § 2255 motion for lack of jurisdiction.6  So we are 
                                                                                                     
“serious drug offense” provision of the ACCA are taken into 
account.  In re Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 
6 The government also contends that allowing Peppers 
to “pass through the jurisdictional door by merely identifying 
the possibility that he was sentenced based on the residual 
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not undermining AEDPA by holding that a movant satisfies 
§ 2255(h)’s gatekeeping requirements with a showing that he 
may have been sentenced under the now-unconstitutional 
residual clause of the ACCA. 
 
Peppers met those requirements by demonstrating that 
the claims in his second § 2255 motion rely on the new rule 
of constitutional law announced in Johnson and made 
retroactive on collateral review in Welch.  The record 
indicates that Peppers was sentenced to the minimum of 
fifteen years’ imprisonment under the ACCA because the 
District Court and the parties believed he had at least three 
prior convictions qualifying as violent felonies under that 
statute.  But the Court did not specify the clauses under which 
those prior convictions qualified as violent felonies.  Once it 
was satisfied that, as defense counsel acknowledged, there 
were at least three prior convictions that “would definitely 
meet the requirements of the Armed Career Criminal Act[,]” 
it stopped its analysis and concluded that the Act applied.  
(App. at 56.)  Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that 
Peppers may have been sentenced under the ACCA’s residual 
clause, and that, in turn, is enough to demonstrate that his 
motion to correct his sentence relies on the new rule of 
constitutional law announced in Johnson.  The District Court 
                                                                                                     
clause” has the practical effect of shifting the burden of proof 
from the defendant to the government.  (Answering Br. at 17.)  
We disagree.  Peppers, as the movant, retains the burden to 
prove both that he has met the gatekeeping requirements and 
that his claim under Johnson is meritorious.  See United 
States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]n 
habeas cases the general rule is that the petitioner himself 
bears the burden of proving that his conviction is illegal.”). 
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thus properly determined that it had jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of Peppers’s § 2255(h)(2) motion. 
 
Having concluded the District Court had jurisdiction to 
hear Peppers’s claims, we must decide the effect of Peppers’s 
(C) plea on his ability to raise Johnson claims collaterally 
attacking his sentence. 
 
B. Peppers’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea 
 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) 
provides that “[a]n attorney for the government and the 
defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro 
se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement” that includes an 
agreement “that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the 
appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, 
or sentencing factor does or does not apply[.]”  Generally, 
“[a] plea of guilty [under that rule] and the ensuing conviction 
comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to 
sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful 
sentence.”  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  
The government argues that, because “Peppers explicitly and 
voluntarily exposed himself” to a fifteen-year sentence in a 
(C) plea, “he cannot now seek collateral relief by arguing that 
his sentence was based on the residual clause.”  (Answering 
Br. at 35.)  Peppers counters that his (C) plea does not 
preclude him from collaterally attacking his sentence because 
his challenge is directed at a sentencing enhancement rather 
than a conviction and “a guilty plea does not foreclose 
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute as applied to a 
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particular defendant.”7  (Opening Br. at 13.)  We agree with 
Peppers that his (C) plea does not preclude his § 2255 motion. 
 
As a general rule, only a limited set of grounds are 
available for a defendant to challenge a conviction or 
sentence based on a guilty plea.  The Supreme Court has 
stated that “when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty 
plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the 
proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the 
underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary.”  Broce, 
488 U.S. at 569.  If the plea was both counseled and 
voluntary, that will generally “foreclose the collateral attack.”  
Id.  Nevertheless, “[t]here are exceptions where on the face of 
the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or 
                                              
7 Our precedent allows a defendant to directly 
challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction 
notwithstanding a guilty plea.  See United States v. Whited, 
311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a defendant’s 
direct challenge to the constitutionality of the statute of 
conviction was not barred by her guilty plea).  And the 
Supreme Court recently held that “a guilty plea [does not] bar 
a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction on 
the ground that the statute of conviction violates the 
Constitution[.]”  Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 801-
02 (2018).  The Court’s holding, however, was cabined to 
direct appeal.  Id. at 803, 805, 807.  In any event, that holding 
does not bear on our resolution of whether Peppers’s (C) plea 
precludes his Johnson claim because Peppers is not 
collaterally attacking the constitutionality of the statute 
underlying his conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Instead, his 
Johnson claim is directed at a sentencing enhancement 
applied under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
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impose the sentence.”  Id.  While “the circumstances under 
which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review” are 
strictly limited, “it would be inconsistent with the doctrinal 
underpinnings of habeas review to preclude [a] petitioner 
from relying on [a new rule of constitutional law] in support 
of his claim that his guilty plea was unconstitutionally 
invalid.”  United States v. Bousley, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). 
 
In line with those principles, we conclude that 
Peppers’s guilty plea does not preclude a collateral attack 
pursuant to Johnson.  It would be impermissible to preclude a 
§ 2255 motion to correct sentence, which meets the 
gatekeeping requirements and is not procedurally barred, 
based on a (C) plea that preserves a now-unlawful sentence.  
Parties may not stipulate to an unlawful sentence in a plea 
agreement.  See, e.g., United States v. Symington, 781 F.3d 
1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that a district court has 
no authority to impose an unlawful sentence even if stipulated 
to by the parties in a plea agreement); United States v. 
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A] district 
court has no discretion to impose a sentence outside of the 
statutory range established by Congress for the offense of 
conviction.” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Moyer, 282 
F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the 
district court erred when it sentenced the defendant pursuant 
to the plea agreement when that sentence contravened the 
applicable law).  If, at the time of sentencing, a plea 
agreement requires imposition of a sentence that either falls 
below or exceeds the statutory penalty limits, the district 
court is without authority to accept that plea.  Therefore, 
when a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court renders 
illegal a sentence that was imposed based on a Rule 
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11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, a defendant who otherwise can 
successfully challenge that sentence in a § 2255 motion 
cannot be held to the unlawful term of imprisonment. 
 
Here, assuming Peppers makes a meritorious § 2255 
claim, it would be unlawful for the District Court to impose 
upon him the sentence he is now serving based on his (C) 
plea agreement.  If Peppers wins on the merits of his Johnson 
claim because he was sentenced under the residual clause and 
his prior convictions do not fall within the remaining clauses 
of the ACCA, then that statute cannot be constitutionally 
applied to him.  In the absence of the ACCA, there is no 
applicable sentencing enhancement that carries with it a 
minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Instead, the maximum sentence for his 
underlying conviction is ten years of imprisonment.  See id. 
§ 924(a)(2).  Therefore, the District Court would be without 
authority to impose a sentence upon Peppers with a term of 
imprisonment any greater than ten years, even if the 
government and Peppers stipulated to a greater term.  The 
plea agreement in this case does just that – it stipulates to a 
term of imprisonment of fifteen years.  For those reasons, the 
(C) plea does not stand as an obstacle to Peppers’s collateral 
attack on his sentence in light of Johnson.8 
                                              
8 The government asserts that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), 
dictates the outcome we should reach here.  In Freeman, the 
Court considered whether a defendant who was sentenced 
pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea could challenge that 
sentence after a subsequent amendment to the applicable 
Guidelines sentencing range.  Id. at 525.  Although no single 
opinion garnered a majority of the Justices’ support, we have 
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Given that conclusion, we turn to the merits of 
Peppers’s second § 2255 motion.  The analysis requires us to 
determine whether his prior felony convictions qualify under 
either the elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause 
of the ACCA.  To do so, however, we must first consider 
whether case law that developed after his sentencing can 
apply to Peppers’s Johnson claims.9 
                                                                                                     
said that Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion controls.  
See id. at 534 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also United 
States v. Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(stating that Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the 
judgment is the controlling opinion in Freeman).  Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court resolved the sentencing issue 
and held that, contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Freeman, “a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C 
agreement is ‘based on’ the defendant’s Guidelines range so 
long as that range was part of the framework the district court 
relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the 
agreement.”  Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 
(2018). 
We do not need to decide here whether to extend the 
rule in Hughes to collateral attacks on sentences under § 2255 
based on Johnson because neither Freeman nor Hughes 
addressed a situation where a new rule of constitutional law 
may have rendered the sentence imposed in a (C) plea 
agreement unlawful.  Under those circumstances, the rule in 
Hughes is inapposite. 
 
9 Specifically, the parties dispute whether, in resolving 
the merits of a Johnson claim, we must apply the law as it 
existed at the time of sentencing to determine whether the 
defendant could have been sentenced under the elements or 
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C. Using Post-Sentencing Case Law to Establish 
the Merits of a Johnson Claim 
 
Ordinarily, new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure, though they form the current state of the law, are 
not applicable to cases that became final before the new rules 
were announced.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).  
Nevertheless, Peppers argues that we should use “the current 
state of the law” to determine whether his prior convictions 
qualify as violent felonies under either the elements clause or 
the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA.  (Opening Br. 
at 20.)  The government counters that we may only use 
“available prior conviction records and case law as it existed 
at the time of sentencing.”  (Answering Br. at 22.)  Under the 
circumstances here, we agree with Peppers. 
 
Supreme Court cases since Peppers’s sentencing have 
provided important guidance on how to interpret whether a 
conviction falls within a given clause of the ACCA.  Those 
decisions include Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016), Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), and 
                                                                                                     
enumerated offenses clause or, conversely, whether the 
defendant is entitled to rely on post-sentencing case law.  For 
reasons discussed herein, see infra Subsection II.C. & n.21, 
we conclude that, once a defendant has satisfied § 2255(h)’s 
gatekeeping requirements by relying on Johnson, he may use 
post-sentencing cases such as Mathis, Descamps, and 
Johnson 2010 to support his Johnson claim. 
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Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson 
2010”).10 
 
In Mathis, the Supreme Court stated that, “[t]o 
determine whether a past conviction [falls within the ACCA’s 
enumerated offenses clause], courts compare the elements of 
the crime of conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ 
version of the listed offense—i.e., the offense as commonly 
understood.”  136 S. Ct. at 2247.  The Court made it clear that 
there is no exception to that rule, even “when a defendant is 
convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means 
of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.”  Id. at 2248.  The 
rule remains “that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA 
predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense.”  Id. at 2247.  
That rule, well known as the “categorical approach,” requires 
the sentencing court to look solely at the elements of the 
crime of conviction and the elements of the generic offense, 
without consulting any of the specific facts of the case.  Id. 
 
When the elements of the statute of conviction – as 
opposed to the means of satisfying the elements – are stated 
“in the alternative,” then the statute is said to be “divisible,” 
and the Supreme Court allows a “modified categorical 
                                              
10 To the extent the parties also dispute the 
applicability of United States v. Steiner, 847 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 
2017), that is better understood as an attack on the 
applicability of Mathis, which dictated our conclusion there.  
See Steiner, 847 F.3d at 119 (holding that the Pennsylvania 
burglary statute is not divisible after Mathis, and must be 
analyzed using a categorical rather than modified categorical 
approach). 
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approach.”  Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257.  Under that approach, 
sentencing courts may “consult a limited class of documents, 
such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which 
alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior 
conviction.”  Id.  After that, the sentencing court proceeds as 
it would under the categorical approach.  Id.  In Descamps, 
the Court considered whether that modified categorical 
approach should be used “when a defendant was convicted 
under an ‘indivisible’ statute—i.e., one not containing 
alternative elements—that criminalizes a broader swath of 
conduct than the relevant generic offense.”  Id. at 258.  The 
Court answered no and held that “sentencing courts may not 
apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible 
set of elements.”  Id.  Indicating that the rule it announced in 
Descamps was not new but rather rested upon old precedent, 
the Court said its “caselaw explaining the categorical 
approach and its ‘modified’ counterpart all but resolves this 
case.”  Id. at 260. 
 
Finally, in Johnson 2010, the Supreme Court 
interpreted what the ACCA means when it speaks of a crime 
involving “physical force.”  559 U.S. at 138.  The Court 
concluded that “physical force” under the ACCA’s elements 
clause means “violent force—that is, force capable of causing 
physical pain or injury to another person.”  Id. at 140 
(emphasis omitted).  It said that such “physical force” cannot 
“be satisfied by the merest touching.”  Id. at 139.  The Court 
then applied that interpretation to hold that Florida’s “felony 
offense of battery by ‘[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]’ 
another person” does not have “as an element the use … of 
physical force against the person of another,” and thus is not 
categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA.  Id. at 135, 
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145 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  Thus, 
Supreme Court cases like Mathis, Descamps, and Johnson 
2010 are instructive on how sentencing courts can properly 
apply the categorical and modified categorical approaches, as 
well as how they must interpret the ACCA’s terms. 
 
Lower federal courts are decidedly split on whether 
current law, including Mathis, Descamps, and Johnson 2010, 
may be used when determining which ACCA clauses a 
defendant’s prior convictions may implicate.  The Courts of 
Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, as well as 
many district courts, have held that only case law existing at 
the time of a defendant’s sentencing may be used to decide 
the merits of the defendant’s § 2255 motion based on 
Johnson.  See, e.g., In re Hires, 825 F.3d 1297, 1302-04 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (concluding that a defendant could not rely on 
Descamps to prove a Johnson claim); Holt v. United States, 
843 F.3d 720, 721-24 (7th Cir. 2016) (determining that a 
defendant’s § 2255(h)(2) motion could not rest on Johnson 
because his claim ultimately turned on other post-sentencing 
cases, such as Mathis).11  Meanwhile, a subsequent panel of 
                                              
11 See also In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Moore, 830 F.3d at 1273; Kane v. United States, 
No. 16-00146, 2016 WL 7404720, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 
2016), aff’d, 706 F. App’x 141 (4th Cir. 2017); Traxler v. 
United States, No. 16-747, 2016 WL 4536329, at *5 (W.D. 
Mich. Aug. 31, 2016), vacated on other grounds, 2017 WL 
4124880 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2017); Ziglar v. United States, 201 
F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1325-26 (M.D. Ala. 2016); Peek v. United 
States, No. 408-221, 2016 WL 4926431, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 
14, 2016); Perez v. United States, No. 16-22379, 2016 WL 
6996150, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2016), aff’d, 2018 WL 
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the Eleventh Circuit, as well as many other district courts, 
have concluded that courts can use case law post-dating a 
defendant’s sentence when deciding the ACCA clauses into 
which that defendant’s prior convictions may fall.  See, e.g., 
In re Adams, 825 F.3d 1283, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that a defendant could rely on Descamps to prove 
his Johnson claim because Descamps “is not an independent 
claim that is itself subject to the gatekeeping 
requirements”).12 
 
This issue, which is one of first impression for us, has 
been divisive because of an underlying difference of opinion 
over the effect of § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping function.  As noted 
earlier, when a defendant brings a second or successive 
§ 2255 motion, the district court must first consider whether 
the motion relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made 
                                                                                                     
1750555 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Dimott v. United States, 
No. 06-26, 2016 WL 6068114, at *3 (D. Me. Oct. 14, 2016), 
aff’d, 881 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 2018); Burgess v. United States, 
No. 493-205, 2016 WL 4618814, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 
2016); King v. United States, No. 16-22261, 202 F. Supp. 3d 
1346, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 2016); Leone v. United States, No. 
16-22200, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1178-79 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
 
12 See also United States v. Christian, 668 F. App’x 
820, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2016); Rogers, 825 F.3d at 1337-40; In 
re Parker, 827 F.3d 1286, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2016), vacated 
on other grounds, 832 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Carrion, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1284-88 (D. Nev. 
2017); United States v. Avery, No. 02-113, 2017 WL 29667, 
at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 3, 2017); United States v. Ladwig, 192 F. 
Supp. 3d 1153, 1159-61 (E.D. Wash. 2016). 
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retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court, that was previously unavailable.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(h)(2); accord 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).  And, for 
such motions, “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be 
retroactive.”  Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001); see 
also In re Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 162 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(extending Tyler’s holding with respect to § 2244(b)(2)(A) to 
the identical language in § 2255(h)(2)).  A new rule is only 
made retroactive by the Supreme Court if that Court has 
“explicitly held, or two or more of its decisions when read 
together … absolutely dictate, that a particular rule is 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”  
Olopade, 403 F.3d at 162. 
 
The Supreme Court has never held that Mathis, 
Descamps, or Johnson 2010 apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review, nor do any combination of Supreme Court 
precedents dictate the retroactivity of those cases.  See Holt, 
843 F.3d at 722 (“Mathis has not been declared retroactive by 
the Supreme Court[.]”); In re Jackson, 776 F.3d 292, 295-96 
(5th Cir. 2015) (indicating that the Supreme Court has not 
made Johnson 2010 retroactive); Groves v. United States, 755 
F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “the Supreme 
Court has not made Descamps retroactive on collateral 
review”).  Because only the Supreme Court can declare which 
new rules of constitutional law are retroactively applicable to 
cases on collateral review in the second or successive habeas 
motion context, Mathis, Descamps, and Johnson 2010 cannot 
provide the foundation that satisfies the gatekeeping 
requirements for a § 2255(h)(2) motion. 
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But that does not end our inquiry into whether those 
cases may be part of a defendant’s arsenal in a collateral 
attack on his sentence.  When a defendant’s second or 
successive § 2255 motion recites a Johnson claim that 
satisfies § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping requirements, the defendant 
is through the gate.  See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264-65 
(concluding that Johnson is “a substantive decision and so has 
retroactive effect under Teague in cases on collateral 
review”).  At that point, we are no longer concerned with 
AEDPA retroactivity and it makes perfect sense to allow a 
defendant to rely upon post-sentencing Supreme Court case 
law that explains the pre-sentencing law.  Cf. Rivers v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A 
judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement 
of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision 
of the case giving rise to that construction.”). 
 
Mathis, Descamps, and Johnson 2010 are such cases.  
An analysis of which ACCA clauses a defendant’s prior 
convictions might fall under should be guided by precedent 
that will “ensure we apply the correct meaning of the 
ACCA’s words.”  Adams, 825 F.3d at 1286.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Mathis, Descamps, and 
Johnson 2010 instruct courts on what has always been the 
proper interpretation of the ACCA’s provisions.  That is 
because, when the Supreme Court “construes a statute, it is 
explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant 
continuously since the date when it became law.”  Rivers, 511 
U.S. at 313 n.12.  In short, those decisions interpreting the 
ACCA are not new law at all, in the sense contemplated by 
Teague.  The rules in Mathis, Descamps, and Johnson 2010 
are “authoritative statement[s] of what the [ACCA] meant 
before as well as after [those] decision[s.]”  Rivers, 511 U.S. 
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at 312-13; see Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551 
(7th Cir. 2016) (“Mathis … is a case of statutory 
interpretation.”); Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 766 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“Descamps is a statutory interpretation 
case[.]”); United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 194 (1st Cir. 
2015) (describing Johnson 2010 as a case involving statutory 
interpretation).  Furthermore, “a rule that requires judges to 
take a research trip back in time and recreate the then-existing 
state of the law—particularly in an area of law as muddy as 
this one—creates its own problems in terms of fairness and 
justiciability.”  United States v. Carrion, 236 F. Supp. 3d 
1280, 1287 (D. Nev. 2017); see also United States v. Ladwig, 
192 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1160 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (“Attempting 
to recreate the legal landscape at the time of a defendant’s 
conviction is difficult enough on its own.”). 
 
We thus hold that, once a defendant has satisfied 
§ 2255(h)’s gatekeeping requirements by relying on Johnson, 
he may use post-sentencing cases such as Mathis, Descamps, 
and Johnson 2010 to support his Johnson claim because they 
are Supreme Court cases that ensure we correctly apply the 
ACCA’s provisions.13 
                                              
13 The government’s argument that allowing the use of 
post-sentencing case law impermissibly bootstraps Mathis, 
Descamps, and Johnson 2010 claims onto a Johnson claim 
ignores that there remains, throughout the entire collateral 
attack, a valid Johnson claim upon which the sentencing court 
is passing judgment.  The post-sentencing case law is not 
being smuggled in under Johnson’s cloak because a proper 
analysis in light of Johnson warrants applying the ACCA’s 
terms correctly.  But see Hires, 825 F.3d at 1303 (“[A 
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Having decided all of the preliminary matters, we can 
now proceed to consider whether Peppers’s prior convictions 
were properly determined to be predicate offenses under the 
ACCA.  We begin with Peppers’s prior convictions for 
robbery under Pennsylvania law. 
 
D. Peppers’s Pennsylvania Robbery Convictions 
 
Peppers’s prior robbery convictions14 do not qualify as 
predicate offenses under the ACCA because a conviction 
under Pennsylvania’s robbery statute does not categorically 
constitute a “violent felony.” 
 
Under the ACCA’s elements clause, any crime that 
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another” qualifies as a 
violent felony.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  The parties do 
not dispute which two convictions are at issue here: Peppers’s 
1979 juvenile robbery conviction and his 1985 robbery 
conviction.  When Peppers was convicted for those crimes, 
the Pennsylvania robbery statute stated: 
                                                                                                     
defendant] cannot use Johnson as a portal to challenge his 
ACCA predicates … based on Descamps.”). 
 
14 The ACCA states that the term “conviction” as used 
in the definition of the term “violent felony” includes “a 
finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile 
delinquency involving a violent felony.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(C).  Thus, we treat Peppers’s 1979 juvenile 
robbery adjudication of delinquency as a “conviction” for 
purposes of our ACCA analysis. 
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(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the 
course of committing a theft, he: 
 
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon 
another; 
 
(ii) threatens another with or 
intentionally puts him in fear of 
immediate serious bodily injury; 
 
(iii) commits or threatens immediately 
to commit any felony of the first 
or second degree; 
 
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another 
or threatens another with or 
intentionally puts him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury; or 
 
(v) physically takes or removes 
property from the person of 
another by force however slight.  
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a) (June 24, 1976 to May 16, 2010).  
The grading provision provided that: “[r]obbery under 
subsection (a)(1)(iv) is a felony of the second degree; robbery 
under subsection (a)(1)(v) is a felony in the third degree; 
otherwise, it is a felony of the first degree.”  Id. § 3701(b). 
  
 The District Court concluded that Peppers’s robbery 
convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA’s 
elements clause rather than the unconstitutional residual 
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clause.  But that conclusion cannot be supported on this 
record.15 
 
As discussed earlier, supra at section II.D., when a 
statute is divisible because it comprises multiple, alternative 
versions of a crime, sentencing courts can resort to the 
“modified categorical approach” to determine whether a 
defendant’s prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses 
under the ACCA.  Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260-62.  That 
approach allows a court “to identify, from among several 
alternatives, the crime of conviction so that the court can 
compare it to the generic offense.”  Id. at 264.  To make that 
determination, it is permissible to look to a narrow category 
of “extra-statutory materials” known as Shepard documents.  
Id. at 263; see generally Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13 (2005).  Those documents include the “charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 
and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”  Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.  After 
consulting Shepard documents and applying the modified 
categorical approach to determine the specific crime of 
conviction, the sentencing court then resorts to the traditional 
                                              
15 The District Court drew its conclusion from the 
government’s earlier use of “the phrase ‘has as an element the 
use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against 
another,’” in a court filing from 2000 titled “Notice of 
Intention to Seek Enhanced Sentencing,” to describe 
Peppers’s prior robbery convictions.  (App. at 5-6; ECF No. 
46 at 2.)  But what the government said in 2000 does not tell 
us under which ACCA clause the District Court later 
concluded Peppers’s prior Pennsylvania robbery convictions 
qualify as predicate offenses. 
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“categorical approach” that requires comparing the criminal 
statute to the relevant generic offense.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2249. 
 
“Given the clearly laid out alternative elements of the 
Pennsylvania robbery statute, it is obviously divisible and, 
therefore, a sentencing court can properly look to the kinds of 
documents listed by the Supreme Court in … Shepard to 
determine which subsection was the basis of [the defendant’s] 
prior convictions.”  United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 225 
(3d Cir. 2013); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (“If 
statutory alternatives carry different punishments, then … 
they must be elements.”); see generally 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3701(b) (providing the punishment grading for violating 
various provisions of subsection (a)(1)).  But, when there are 
no Shepard documents for the sentencing court to consult, the 
modified categorical approach becomes a useless tool.  The 
only thing differentiating the categorical and modified 
categorical approaches is the consultation of Shepard 
documents to determine which of multiple alternative 
offenses in a single criminal statute the prisoner was 
convicted under.  Without Shepard documents, the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches are the same, 
and the sentencing court is forced to proceed under the 
categorical approach.  Here, that is exactly what is required.  
The parties admit that no Shepard documents have been 
produced by either Peppers or the government and, thus, we 
do not know under which provision of the Pennsylvania 
robbery statute Peppers was convicted.16  Therefore, we must 
turn to the categorical approach. 
                                              
16 Peppers admitted through his counsel at the time of 
sentencing that his 1979 and 1985 robbery convictions were 
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both “armed robbery” convictions.  (App. at 31, 56.)  Yet, 
even if a defendant’s admissions are encompassed within 
those forms of evidence contemplated by Shepard, the fact 
that Peppers’s convictions were for “armed robbery” does not 
help us identify under which of the five subsections of 
Pennsylvania’s robbery statute he was convicted.  One would 
think that an “armed” robbery, which involves the use of a 
weapon, would typically be charged as a first-degree felony, 
and Peppers acknowledges that “armed” robberies are 
“generally charged under § 3701(a)(1)(ii),” which is a first-
degree felony under Pennsylvania’s robbery statute.  
(Opening Br. at 32); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 10 
A.3d 336, 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (noting that a defendant 
was charged and convicted of armed robbery under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)).  But Pennsylvania case law 
suggests that there are several instances in which defendants 
were convicted of armed robbery under other provisions, 
including the third-degree felony provision, § 3701(a)(1)(v).  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ali, No. 525-EDA-2014, 2015 
WL 7430301, at *1 & n.1, *4-5, *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 
2015) (affirming a defendant’s sentence following 
convictions under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), (iii), 
and (v) based on facts involving an armed robbery); 
Commonwealth v. Runk, No. 1621-MDA-2014, 2015 WL 
7260326, at *1 & nn.1-2, *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 28, 2015) 
(same following convictions under § 3701(a)(1)(ii) and (v)); 
Commonwealth v. Haynes, No. 58-EDA-2013, 2014 WL 
10965752, at *1, *4 & n.1, *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2014) 
(denying a defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief 
following a conviction for armed robbery under, among other 
things, § 3701(a)(1)(v)). 
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As a reminder, under the categorical approach, the 
“focus [is] solely on whether the elements of the crime of 
conviction sufficiently match the elements of generic 
burglary, while ignoring the particular facts of the case.”  
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.  “How a given defendant actually 
perpetrated the crime … makes no difference; even if his 
conduct fits within the generic offense, the mismatch of 
elements saves the defendant from an ACCA sentence.”  Id. 
at 2251.  We are required to “presume that the conviction 
‘rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts’ 
criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are 
encompassed by the generic federal offense.”  Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Johnson 2010, 559 U.S. at 137). 
 
The least culpable act covered by Pennsylvania’s 
robbery statute at the time of Peppers’s convictions 
criminalizes physically taking or removing “property from the 
person of another by force however slight.”  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v).  Pennsylvania law interprets “force 
however slight” to include “any amount of force applied to a 
person while committing a theft[,]” including the mere “use 
of threatening words or gestures, and operates on the mind.”  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. 1984).  
“The degree of actual force is immaterial, so long as it is 
sufficient to separate the victim from his property[.]”  Id.  
Although we held in United States v. Cornish “that any 
conviction for robbery under the Pennsylvania robbery 
statute, regardless of the degree, has as an element the use of 
force against the person of another[,]” 103 F.3d 302, 309 (3d 
Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in 
Johnson 2010 has placed significant doubt on that holding. 
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As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Johnson 
2010 held that the phrase “physical force” in the ACCA’s 
elements clause “means violent force—that is, force capable 
of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”  559 
U.S. at 140 (emphasis omitted).  It concluded that a prior 
conviction under Florida’s battery law, which criminalized 
“any intentional physical contact, ‘no matter how slight,’” 
was not a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause 
because the broad range of conduct encompassed by that state 
law did not have “as an element the use … of physical force 
against the person of another.”  Id. at 135, 138, 145 (citations 
omitted).  It reached that conclusion because “physical force” 
under the ACCA’s elements clause is not “satisfied by the 
merest touching.”  Id. at 139. 
 
Here, again, the Pennsylvania robbery statute 
criminalizes “physically tak[ing] or remov[ing] property from 
the person of another by force however slight[.]”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v) (emphasis added).  Because that 
has been interpreted to include “any amount of force applied 
to a person while committing a theft[,]” including the mere 
“use of threatening words or gestures, and operates on the 
mind,” and because “[t]he degree of actual force is 
immaterial, so long as it is sufficient to separate the victim 
from his property,” Brown, 484 A.2d at 741, Pennsylvania’s 
robbery statute suffers from the same issues the Supreme 
Court identified with Florida’s battery statute in Johnson 
2010.  Both laws proscribe the merest touching, which is 
insufficient conduct to meet the “physical force” requirement 
under the ACCA’s elements clause.  Thus, we think it plain 
that Johnson 2010 abrogated our holding in Cornish with 
respect to third degree robbery under Pennsylvania law. 
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Consequently, Pennsylvania’s robbery statute for third 
degree robbery does not fall within the elements clause of the 
ACCA because that state law provision is broader than the 
generic force requirements under the ACCA.  Since we have 
no Shepherd documents to guide us and are thus left to apply 
the categorical approach in assessing Peppers’s robbery 
convictions, we must assume he was convicted under the 
third degree robbery provisions and hence under a provision 
of Pennsylvania law that is broader than the generic 
requirements of the elements clause of the ACCA.17  
Furthermore, a conviction under that Pennsylvania statute 
does not fall within the ACCA’s enumerated offenses clause 
because robbery is not enumerated.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(B)(2)(ii) (enumerating only burglary, arson, 
extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives).  The 
only remaining option, then, is that Peppers was sentenced 
pursuant to the unconstitutional residual clause.18 
                                              
17 Importantly, our holding today does not speak to 
whether convictions under any single provision of the 
Pennsylvania robbery statute, other than 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3701(v), categorically qualify as violent felonies under the 
ACCA. 
 
18 This is yet another example of a disconcerting 
outcome driven not by statute or a common understanding of 
concepts like “violent felony” but by the strictures of the 
categorical approach.  See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 
866 F.3d 129, 136-39 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring) 
(noting Judge Wilkinson’s non-exhaustive list of ten cases in 
which the categorical approach allowed “repeat offenders [to] 
avoid sentencing enhancements for their violent crimes[,]” 
and Judge Lynch’s recognition that “the categorical approach 
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E. Peppers’s Pennsylvania Burglary Conviction 
 
It is less clear whether Peppers’s prior burglary 
conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the ACCA.19  
Looking first at the enumerated offenses clause, we are once 
again, under the categorical approach, required to determine 
“whether the crime of conviction is the same as, or narrower 
than, the relevant generic offense.”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2257.  If the statute under which the defendant was previously 
convicted is broader than the generic crime of burglary, and if 
that statute is indivisible, then that prior conviction does not 
qualify as an ACCA predicate under the enumerated offenses 
clause.  Id. 
 
One of the ACCA’s enumerated offenses is burglary, 
in its generic variety.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 598.  But the generic version of burglary has “the 
basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a 
crime.”  Id. at 599.  Those elements encompass a narrower 
                                                                                                     
forces judges into an alternative reality” (citing United States 
v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring) and United States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 60 (1st 
Cir. 2017) (Lynch, J., concurring))). 
 
19 Pennsylvania law at the time of Peppers’s burglary 
conviction provided that “[a] person [was] guilty of burglary 
if he enter[ed] a building or occupied structure, or separately 
secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a 
crime therein, unless the premises [were] at the time open to 
the public or the actor [was] licensed or privileged to enter.”  
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a) (1973). 
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class of behavior than does the relevant version of the 
Pennsylvania burglary statute because Pennsylvania’s statute 
includes vehicles within its definition of occupied structure, 
while the generic version does not. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3501 (defining “occupied structure” to include “any … 
vehicle … adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, 
or for carrying on business therein”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 
(indicating that state burglary statutes criminalizing entry into 
“places, such as automobiles …, other than buildings,” define 
burglary more broadly than Congress’s generic definition); 
see also United States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that Pennsylvania’s burglary statute is 
broader than the generic burglary offense).  Under the 
categorical approach then, there is not an equivalence that 
allows us to say that burglary under Pennsylvania law 
categorically qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense, at least 
not under the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA.20 
                                              
20 That conclusion is not altered by resort to the 
modified categorical approach because there can be no such 
resort.  We have foreclosed application of the modified 
categorical approach when analyzing convictions under 
Pennsylvania’s burglary statute.  In our recent decision in 
United States v. Steiner, we considered the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis on the proper 
interpretation of that statute.  847 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 
2017).  We held “[t]he statute is not divisible and, after 
Mathis, a categorical approach, rather than a modified 
categorical approach, must be used.”  Id. at 119.  While the 
Steiner decision dealt with the 1993 Pennsylvania burglary 
statute, it is identical to the statute Peppers was convicted 
under in 1983 in Pennsylvania state court.  Compare 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3502(a) (1973), with id. § 3502(a) (1991).  The 
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To determine whether the unconstitutional residual 
clause of the ACCA was necessarily the basis for Peppers’s 
burglary conviction, we must also rule out the elements 
clause as a basis.  Peppers has the burden of proving the 
merits of his Johnson claim, see supra note 6, which means 
he bears the burden of demonstrating that his sentence 
implicated the residual clause of the ACCA.21  But he has 
                                                                                                     
District Court therefore erred by applying the modified 
categorical approach to determine whether Peppers’s prior 
Pennsylvania burglary conviction qualified as a violent felony 
under the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA.  The 
specific facts of Peppers’s case are irrelevant.  Given the state 
of our law, Peppers’s conviction under Pennsylvania’s 
burglary statute cannot qualify as a predicate offense pursuant 
to the ACCA’s enumerated offenses clause. 
 
21 To prove a Johnson claim, we think it incumbent on 
a § 2255 movant to demonstrate that his sentence necessarily 
implicates the residual clause, which may be shown either by 
evidence that the district court in fact sentenced him under the 
residual clause or proof that he could not have been sentenced 
under the elements or enumerated offenses clauses based on 
current case law, and that that made a difference in his 
sentence.  Although it appears that different tests have 
emerged for determining whether a movant has proven a 
Johnson claim at the merits stage, see, e.g., Beeman, 871 F.3d 
at 1221 (“We conclude, and hold, that, like any other § 2255 
movant, a Johnson § 2255 claimant must prove his claim … 
[by showing] that—more likely than not—it was use of the 
residual clause that led to the sentencing court’s enhancement 
of his sentence.”); Geozos, 870 F.3d at 895-97 (indicating that 
a movant proves a Johnson claim by showing that it is unclear 
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neither briefed nor argued on appeal that, categorically, his 
Pennsylvania burglary conviction does not qualify as a 
predicate offense under the ACCA’s elements clause.  That 
argument was thus forfeited.22  See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. 
of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“‘[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right,’ an example of which is an inadvertent failure to raise 
                                                                                                     
whether a sentencing court relied on the residual clause and 
that that error was not harmless based on categorical analyses 
of those prior convictions under current case law); see also 
United States v. Taylor, 873 F.3d 476, 479-81 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(summarizing different approaches among circuit courts for 
deciding Johnson claims), the main distinguishing feature 
seems to be whether a movant may rely on post-sentencing 
case law to prove his Johnson claim.  We have resolved here 
that § 2255 movants are entitled to use current case law to 
prove their claims.  See supra Subsection II.C.  We have also 
already established that there is a meaningful difference 
between the standard to be met at the jurisdictional 
gatekeeping stage of the analysis of a second-or-successive § 
2255 motion and at the merits stage.  See discussion supra 
Subsection II.A.  Thus, for the merits analysis to be 
meaningfully different and to keep the burden of proof on the 
movant, where it belongs, it is appropriate to require the 
movant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
sentence depends on the ACCA’s residual clause. 
 
22 We do not decide whether a conviction under 
Pennsylvania’s burglary statute categorically qualifies as a 
violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. 
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an argument.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))). 
 
For that reason, although Peppers’s burglary 
conviction cannot qualify as a predicate offense under the 
enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA, we conclude that 
Peppers has not met his burden of proving that he was 
necessarily sentenced under the unconstitutional residual 
clause of the ACCA because he failed to show that the 
burglary conviction does not qualify under the elements 
clause.23  Peppers’s burglary conviction thus stands as a 
qualifying predicate offense. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Because we have decided that Peppers’s sentence was 
imposed due to constitutional error given that he may have 
been sentenced pursuant to the now-unconstitutional residual 
clause of the ACCA, the District Court must resolve whether 
that error was harmless.  See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 638 (1993) (indicating that when a court finds that a 
defendant’s sentence was imposed due to constitutional error, 
it must then determine whether that constitutional error was 
harmless).  The District Court noted that “the record reflects 
that Peppers also has a prior drug charge which qualifies as a 
                                              
23 Peppers also argues that the District Court erred 
when it relied upon his Presentence Investigation Report and 
the government’s brief to determine he was not sentenced 
under the ACCA’s residual clause, both of which he argues 
are improper Shepard documents.  We do not need to address 
those concerns, however, because our analysis does not rely 
on that body of disputed evidence. 
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predicate offense.”  (App. at 7.)  The District Court should 
analyze in the first instance whether Peppers has at least two 
other qualifying predicate offenses rendering any 
constitutional error harmless.  If the Court concludes that the 
error was not harmless, it must proceed to correct Peppers’s 
sentence by removing the sentencing enhancement under the 
ACCA and resentencing him for the underlying crime he pled 
guilty to – being a felon in possession of a firearm, which 
carries a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the 
District Court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
